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Preface
The AICPA’s program  of self-regulation, 
the focus o f the Public Oversight Board’s re­
sponsibility, is a recent and little known addi­
tion to the activities of the public accounting 
profession. Many people who should do not 
even know of its existence. Few understand it 
thoroughly. Many who benefit from  its activi­
ties possess bu t a partial knowledge of its 
workings.
M em bers of the Board, some of whom  
were involved in the program ’s developm ent, 
have observed changes in the self-regulatory 
program  of the accounting profession, both  
in concept and practice, as those who pio­
neered its im plem entation learned from  ex­
perience what will and will no t work, what is 
and is not needed, what can and cannot be 
accomplished.
Six years is little enough in the history of 
m ost enduring institutions. Yet because of 
the substantial efforts that preceded the pres­
ent program  for audit quality, the com m it­
m ent o f participants, and the excellence of 
leadership, self-regulation of the accounting 
profession has com e a long way.
The Board believes its report for 1983-84 
should include not only its report on the 
activities of the past year bu t also a full descrip­
tion of the self-regulatory program  as it exists 
today and the way in which self-regulation is 
viewed by those involved in its oversight This 
booklet fulfills the latter objective: a descrip­
tion of the nature, scope, and complexity of 
the accounting profession’s self-regulatory pro­
gram, and the way in which that program  
combines with other regulatory efforts to pro­
vide m axim um  protection to the financial 
and investing public. We do so both  to clarify 
the extent of the Board’s responsibilities, as 
we see them, and to draw attention to the 
profession’s efforts and the dedication o f its 
mem bers. Perhaps even m ore im portant, we 
desire to share with others what we have learned 
about professional regulation.
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Introduction
In 1977, the accounting profession embarked on 
a program for increasing the basis for reliance by 
the financial public on audit opinions. It was a 
unique experiment because no other profession 
had then, or has since, adopted a comparable 
program.
The new program called for additional con­
trols over the accounting profession. Those con­
trols were self imposed, conceived in controversy, 
implemented under surveillance, and exist today 
not without criticism. Nevertheless, the program 
as it now stands is an extraordinary achievement, 
although it is little understood by many members 
of the profession and virtually unknown to its 
major beneficiaries.
Nature of Professional Regulation
During this relatively brief period, the ac­
counting profession has learned a great deal about 
the nature of professional regulation. Experiences 
gained during the successful operation of the pro­
gram over the past six years have provided valuable 
insights, new perspectives, and a clearer under­
standing of the nature of regulation and the roles 
that different organizations play in attaining it
Regulation of professional practice is applied 
at three levels: by the firm, by the profession, and 
by government Each has the same goal— satis­
factorily reliable accounting and auditing services 
to society. However, each of the three uses dif­
ferent means to achieve the desired goal. One 
means of reaching that goal is to punish persons 
found guilty of fraudulent or otherwise unaccept­
able service. This is usually accomplished at the 
government level by action in courts of law, and 
by authorized regulatory and licensing agencies. 
A second means of attaining the goal is educa­
tional in nature, and consists of the establishment 
of professional standards, conveying these to 
members of the profession, and assisting prac­
titioners in complying with them. This is usually 
accomplished within the profession by pro­
fessional societies and by individual practitioners 
and firms. Thus, punishment and education are 
two diverse approaches by which the goal of ade­
quate public protection is sought
Within a professional firm, steps must be 
taken to assure that its work measures up to the 
expectations of clients and others, or the firm will 
soon have diminished opportunity to serve. In 
large measure, such expectations are established 
by the general level of work of competing firms. 
Thus, competitive pressure, working through the 
firm, is the prime mover for regulation at the 
firm level.
Private regulation at the firm level is seldom 
thought of as “ regulation.” Yet, more than any 
other influence for the improvement of pro­
fessional practice, private regulation is present 
and working. Self-interest should lead a firm’s 
management to rid itself of the incompetent, the 
negligent, and the untrustworthy. It is at the firm 
level that most continuing education takes place, 
that practitioners learn of new standards, develop­
ments, and opportunities for improved service. It 
is also at the firm level that inadequate perfor­
mance of professional duties is most likely to ter­
minate a practitioner’s career.
Additional regulation takes place at the level 
of the profession. Professional organizations 
generally have as one of their most important 
goals the elevation of the quality of professional 
performance. Ethical and other standards, con­
tinuing education programs and professional 
meetings, and provisions for censure and expul­
sion from membership are educational and puni­
tive efforts used to improve a profession’s service 
to its various publics. The tie between pro­
fessional or peer regulation and private regula­
tion is a close one. Through acquaintances made 
at professional meetings and programs, prac­
titioners learn of new practices and procedures 
found useful by others and by adopting these they 
improve the quality of their own firm’s work
The third level of regulation—public regu­
lation— is imposed by government in a variety of 
forms. Qualifying examinations, licensing pro­
visions, regulatory requirements, all represent 
efforts by governmental authorities to assure satis­
factorily reliable service to the public. Additionally, 
government regulation is characterized by inves­
tigations, legal actions, negotiated settlements, 
injunctions, and punishment
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To many people, the term “regulation” brings 
to mind preeminently punishment of those found 
guilty of unsatisfactory conduct and to them regu­
lation, to be effective, must have the characteris­
tics of government regulation. It is much more 
useful and much more accurate to view regula­
tion in its totality with private and professional 
regulation having roles that are equally as impor­
tant to that of government in attaining the goal of 
meeting society’s needs.
To be sure, public regulation has unique 
and important capabilities not shared by private 
and professional regulation. The power of sub­
poena, the ultimate authority of government, the 
traditions and practices of the judicial system, 
and the rules for assuring fair treatment of all par­
ties to a dispute assure effectiveness and equity 
well beyond the power or ability of either private 
or professional regulation. On the other hand, for 
instance, the capacity of professional organiza­
tions and private firms to provide educational op­
portunities far exceeds anything government is 
likely to find feasible. Chart A broadly sum­
marizes the activities at the various levels of regu­
lation of a profession.
For these reasons, regulation of a profession 
requires the best efforts at all three levels. No one 
level of regulation is adequate alone. Indeed, no 
one of them can substitute for any other. If society’s 
needs are to be served, all three must be involved 
and be effective.
This report describes how these regulatory 
efforts operate and interrelate, and summarizes 
the manner in which the Division for CPA Firms 
of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants contributes to professional regulation.
Genesis of the AICPA Program
During the decade of the 1970s, some mem­
bers of Congress and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission expressed concern regarding the 
credibility of financial statements issued by pub­
licly-owned corporations and the reliability of 
audit reports thereon issued by independent ac­
counting firms. In the resulting discussions with 
representatives of the accounting profession, at­
tention was focused on the manner in which the 
profession was organized, regulated, and dis­
ciplined. While the adequacy of financial account­
ing standards and the accounting standard-setting 
process were also questioned, most of the criticism 
centered on the performance of independent ac­
countants and the audit process.
In the view of its most vocal critics, the ac­
counting profession was of considerable public















Permission to practice 
Civil litigation
Investigation and punishment of 
violators of laws and regulations
importance but unregulated. On the other hand, 
many accountants thought adequate control exis­
ted through the SEC, state boards of accountancy, 
the profession’s code of ethics, and the common 
law governing contractual relationships. They ar­
gued that individual accountants and firms were 
not free to do whatever they pleased because 
competitive forces encouraged discipline within 
firms, and the judicial system appeared entirely 
adequate to hold accountants accountable when 
investors suffered losses, allegedly because of 
auditing or accounting failures. However, these 
arguments did not satisfy the profession’s critics.
Peer regulation had existed for many years, 
commencing in 1887 when the first society of 
independent accountants was formed. Named 
the American Association of Public Accountants, 
it was the direct predecessor of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. At that 
time, the public accounting profession consisted 
chiefly of sole practitioners operating out of single 
offices with few or no professional staff. Conse­
quently, the professional organization’s rules were 
then and continued to be applicable to individual 
practitioners, not firms.
As business enterprises grew and expanded 
across state and national boundaries, the public 
accounting firms servicing their needs also ex­
panded, many into larger and then into multiple 
offices, and some into complex multinational 
organizations consisting of hundreds of practice 
offices and thousands of professionals.
During this period of dramatic change in the 
practice of public accounting and in the size of 
accounting firms, the organizations concerned 
with peer regulation of accountants did not foresee 
a need for, and therefore did not create, a mecha­
nism to regulate public accounting firms. Rules 
of conduct of state societies of CPAs, as well as 
those of the AICPA, continued to deal only with
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the conduct of individual members. Not until 
1977 did the AICPA create a mechanism to regu­
late firms.
In that year, responsive to public and Con­
gressional criticism, and over the objections of 
many accountants, the Council of the AICPA— its 
governing body—accepted the challenge and es­
tablished a Division for CPA Firms. The Division 
consists of two sections, an SEC Practice Section 
(SECPS) and a Private Companies Practice Sec­
tion (PCPS). Membership in either section is vol­
untary. These sections provide the organizational 
structure for the present peer regulation of the 
activities of member firms. See Chart B.
The Public Oversight Board, independent of 
the Division, whose members were to be “drawn 
from among prominent individuals of high integ­
rity and reputation” was formed to oversee the 
activities of the SEC Practice Section and repre­
sent the public interest in the performance of its 
oversight function.
CHART B Organization o f the Division for CPA Firms
* The SEC has oversight of the profession in general. The Public Oversight Board generally serves as a liaison between the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the SEC Practice Section and coordinates access by the SEC to selected peer review and Board 
workpapers.
* *  The Technical Issues Committee monitors AICPA technical committees and develops recommendations to these groups from the 
perspective of accountants who serve private companies.
* * * The Member Services Committee develops and administers a program of PCPS member services.




































Components of the Regulatory Process
A full program of regulation of accountants and 
accounting should include provisions for the 
following:
■ Admission of qualified people to professional 
practice.
■ Establishment of generally accepted accounting 
principles and professional standards for account­
ing and auditing services and quality control.
■ Continuing education for practicing accountants in 
accounting principles and professional standards.
■ Periodic and regular determination of compliance 
with professional standards.
■ Investigation of alleged deficiencies in complying 
with professional standards.
■ Punishment of those found guilty of unacceptable 
practices.
■ Maintenance of adequate competition.
Chart C illustrates how all these varying 
requirements are provided for. Note that all three 
levels of regulation are required if these goals are 
to be achieved.
Private Regulation
The management of a public accounting firm 
has the responsibility to prescribe appropriate 
operating policies and practices. To be viable, the 
firm must be competitive in its market area and 
ensure that its policies and practices are in accor­
dance with standards established by rule-making 
bodies such as the Auditing Standards Board of the 
AICPA, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In addition, the AICPA Quality Control 
Standards Committee in 1979 established a set of 
quality control standards governing the account­
ing and auditing practices of accounting firms. 
Each section of the Division for CPA Firms requires 
its members to adhere to these standards. Thus, 
each member firm must establish, maintain, and 
enforce quality control policies and procedures 
that provide reasonable assurance of compliance 
with professional standards in the conduct of its 
accounting and auditing practice. These quality 
control standards are discussed at some length in 
a later section of this report
CHART C Scope o f Regulation o f CPA Finns
Level Regulatory Organizations
Public Federal and State Regulatory Agencies
Regulation
Federal and State Courts 
State Boards of Accountancy
Principal Activities
  License qualified firms and individuals to practice public 
accounting
■ Regulate firms and individuals in practice of public 
accounting
■ Enforce laws and regulations
■ Punish violators of laws and regulations
Peer
Regulation
AICPA and State CPA Societies 
AICPA Division for CPA Firms 
Voluntary Associations of CPA Firms 
Private Sector Accounting Standard-Setters 
Financial Accounting Standards Board 
Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board
■ Promulgate and enforce rules of professional conduct
■ Establish accounting principles and standards for 
accounting and auditing services and quality control
■ Develop and offer continuing education programs
■ Administer peer review programs
■ Investigate alleged audit failures
■ Discipline those who violate rules of professional conduct
Private CPA Firms and Practitioners ■ Development and enforcement of quality control policies
Regulation and procedures
■ Continuous training of firm personnel
■ On-line supervision
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Regulation of the day- to- day actions of part­
ners and staff members is accomplished more 
effectively and persuasively by firm management 
than by any other participant in the regulatory 
process. Disciplinary measures applied within a 
firm are rarely publicized outside the firm. None­
theless, in our opinion, they are extremely effec­
tive. Responses to inquiries of firm representatives 
made by the Special Investigations Committee of 
the SEC Practice Section suggest that private regu­
lation is generally direct, immediate, and aimed 
at improving the quality of service to clients. Con­
trol over employment and compensation pro­
vides effective authority. Persons judged to be 
inadequate in performance of their professional 
responsibilities may be demoted, transferred, or 
terminated. Those who do well are rewarded. In 
some cases, remedial measures can be instituted 
to improve personnel performance, to draw atten­
tion to policies and established practices, or to 
strengthen policies and procedures judged to be 
in need of improvement
For many firms, pride and professionalism 
undoubtedly provide sufficient incentive to mon­
itor performance of partners and staff members 
as well as to establish and implement effective 
policies and practices. However, added incentive 
is provided by competitive forces in the market­
place and by the desire to avoid the damage to the 
firm’s reputation and the other penalties that 
accompany litigation alleging noncompliance with 
professional standards. Thus, much of the moti­
vation for private regulation comes from within 
the firm and is directly related to its economic and 
professional success.
Peer Regulation
Peer regulation can occur only when prac­
titioners, through firms or individually, affiliate 
with an organization that has as one of its pur­
poses the upgrading of professional performance. 
In accounting, membership in such organizations 
has always been voluntary so that acceptance of 
peer regulation is a voluntary act. Independent 
accounting firms that join the Division for CPA 
Firms make a serious commitment to comply 
with all professional standards and to make public 
specified information about themselves. The most 
far-reaching membership requirement—and the 
one that permits both sections to obtain assurance 
that a member firm is complying with professional 
standards—requires the firm to have the ade­
quacy of its quality control system for its account­
ing and auditing practice and its compliance with 
that system reviewed by independent peers every
three years and to make public the report issued 
by the reviewers.
Without question, peer review is the center- 
piece of the program of peer regulation of the 
Division for CPA Firms. A peer review is carried 
out under the supervision of a carefully selected 
committee. In addition, peer reviews of SECPS 
member firms are reviewed by members and staff 
of the Public Oversight Board. Independent peer 
reviewers evaluate and test the firm’s quality con­
trol system to determine whether it is suitable and 
appropriate for the firm’s accounting and audit­
ing practice and whether it is being complied 
with. In the course of the review, the reviewers 
examine the financial statements and the audit 
report and workpapers and other documentary 
material related to selected accounting and audit­
ing engagements to determine whether the firm’s 
personnel complied with professional standards 
in performing their work In that connection, the 
firm’s quality control policies and procedures 
must be sufficiently comprehensive to provide 
reasonable assurance of conformity with all 
appropriate professional standards. The review 
procedures have been thoughtfully designed and 
tested to enable the reviewers and the Section’s 
Peer Review Committee to determine whether 
the firm has an acceptable quality control system 
for its accounting and auditing practice.
Members of the Section must report all liti­
gation involving the firm or its personnel that 
alleges an “audit failure” with respect to an SEC 
registrant A special committee (the Special Inves­
tigations Committee) reviews each such case to 
consider whether the allegations indicate the need 
for corrective action by the firm or for recon­
sideration of professional standards.
The programs of the Peer Review and Spe­
cial Investigations Committees complement and 
supplement one another. Peer review determines 
(1) the existence and adequacy of the reviewed 
firm’s quality control system and (2) on a sam­
pling basis, the extent to which the firm’s person­
nel comply with it. The Special Investigations 
Committee follows up when specified allegations 
indicate that there is possibility that a firm’s quality 
control system and compliance with it may not be 
as effective as the peer review may have found 
them to be. Together the peer review and special 
investigative processes provide the public with 
additional assurance that member firms are ap­
plying rigorous professional standards in the con­
duct of their accounting and auditing practice. All 
activities of the Section are actively monitored by 
the Public Oversight Board.
Some regional and local firms band together
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in associations in order to facilitate such matters 
as correspondent relationships, continuing edu­
cation, consultation on technical issues, policy 
formulation, and compliance with standards. 
Member firms maintain their own identities, 
operate under their own names, and sacrifice 
little, if any, authority as a requirement of mem­
bership. There now are over twenty such associa­
tions, many of them international in scope. Some 
associations require their members periodically 
to subject their accounting and auditing practice 
to peer review by other association members. The 
Division accepts intra-association peer reviews as 
long as they meet certain requirements established 
by the Peer Review Committees of each section.
Like private regulation, peer regulation is 
positive, continuing, and effective. The peer regu­
latory program of the Section reaches virtually all 
firms that have a significant SEC practice. Its 
primary goal is to improve future practice, not to 
punish mistakes of the past Punishment in the 
form of a sanction by the Section is properly 
limited to situations when the firm fails to under­
take corrective action considered necessary by the 
Section. In this connection, it is well to point out 
that institution of the Division’s self-regulatory 
program has not diminished in anyway the already 
existing forms of government regulation. The 
Institute’s program represents an addition to, not 
a substitute for, any regulation already existing.
Public Regulation
Government or public regulation of accoun­
tants is intended to protect the investing public 
from fraud, gross negligence, or failure to comply 
with the laws and regulations that relate to inde­
pendent audits of financial statements. Persons 
found guilty of noncompliance with minimum 
standards of performance established by law are 
subject to punishment which generally takes the 
form of damages to those claiming injury, public 
censure, injunction, suspension, bar from prac­
ticing before the SEC, or temporary or perma­
nent loss of license to practice.
To many people, government regulation 
constitutes the regulatory model. To these peo­
ple, unless, an organization’s efforts are directed 
to identifying, convicting, and punishing those 
who have failed to meet the requirements of the 
law or the expectations of society, its program is 
not effective. But the Section’s program is not 
designed to do that. Peer regulation properly cen­
ters on strengthening systems of quality control 
and improving the effective performance of audits. 
Those who endanger or injure the investing public
through willful fraud or gross negligence should 
be apprehended and punished, but that task can 
be left to the governmental regulators and courts 
who do it quite well.
Interrelationship of Private, Peer, 
and Public Regulation
Peer regulation is inextricably intertwined 
with the two other levels of regulation governing 
the practice of public accounting. All levels are 
interrelated and each derives part of its effective­
ness from roles played by the other two levels.1
Private regulation—policies and procedures 
dictated and enforced by firm management— 
plays a most significant role. Since the benefits of 
private regulation flow directly to the owners of 
the firm—and conversely since noncompliance 
with professional and legal requirements directly 
affects the owners adversely—private regulation 
is potentially the most effective form of regula­
tion. It can deal with problem areas immediately 
and authoritatively.
The effectiveness of peer regulation is directly 
commensurate with the number of firms that join 
the program and agree to abide by its rules and to 
have their actions judged by peers. Peer regula­
tion, in effect, evaluates and publicly reports on 
the effectiveness of private regulation. Peer regu­
lation has several beneficiaries. The general public, 
and especially the investing public, benefits by 
receiving improved accounting and auditing ser­
vices. Member firms enjoy the benefits that accrue 
to membership in a prestigious, quality organiza­
tion, especially the constructive criticism of peers. 
The profession benefits in several ways: the pro­
gram, by upgrading the quality of practice, reduces 
the possibility of future audit failure and the resul­
tant negative effects not only on the firms involved 
but on the entire profession. Governmental regu­
latory agencies are also direct beneficiaries of 
peer regulation. As SEC Chairman John S. R. 
Shad recently remarked:
“Improvements in the implementation of these pro­
grams are enabling the [accounting] profession to 
assume greater self-regulatory responsibilities and 
permitting the Commission to limit its involvement 
to an oversight role. ”2
1 Robert K. Mautz, “Self-regulation—criticisms and a response,” 
Journal of Accountancy, April 1984.
 
2 John  S. R. Shad, Self Regulation of the Accounting Profession, an address 
before the Eleventh Annual Conference on Current SEC Develop­




The quality of services of a CPA firm is dependent 
in large part on its system of quality control. In 
1979, the AICPA established quality control stan­
dards governing the conduct of audit engage­
ments.3 Thus, a firm of independent auditors 
should establish quality control policies and pro­
cedures to provide it with reasonable assurance of 
conforming with generally accepted auditing 
standards in its audit engagements. Generally 
accepted auditing standards relate to the conduct 
of individual audit engagements; quality control 
standards relate to the conduct of a firm’s audit 
practice as a whole.
Early in the formation of the self-regulatory 
program, the importance of quality control stan­
dards was recognized and adherence to them was 
made a membership requirement of both the 
SEC Practice Section and the Private Companies 
Practice Section.
Elements of a System of 
Quality Control for CPA Firms
A system of quality control for a CPA firm 
has nine elements. They are:
■ Independence
■ Acceptance and continuance of clients
■ Hiring






A system of quality control for a firm encom­
3 The elements of quality control were identified in Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 4 and incorporated in Statement on Quality 
Control Standards No. 1, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm, 
issued by the Quality Control Standards Committee, the senior 
AICPA technical committee designated to issue pronouncements 
on quality control standards.
passes the firm’s organizational structure and the 
policies adopted and procedures established to 
provide the firm with reasonable assurance of 
conforming with professional standards. The nature 
and extent of a firm’s quality control policies and 
procedures depend on a number of factors such 
as its size, the degree of operating autonomy 
allowed its personnel and its practice offices, the 
nature of its practice, its organization, and ap­
propriate cost-benefit considerations. The policies 
and procedures with which peer review is con­
cerned are those that apply to all auditing and 
accounting services offered by the firm, typically 
a significant part of its total services. The stan­
dards are broad in nature, covering all of the 
firm’s activities that have a bearing on the quality 
of its accounting and auditing services.
The Section’s SECPS Manual provides con­
siderable information on how a firm might establish 
policies and procedures that will comply with the 
quality control standards relating to each of these 
components. Illustrative models of quality con­
trol systems for firms of varying sizes are available 
from the AICPA The following discussion includes 
only sufficient explanation of each element of 
quality control to provide an understanding of its 
nature and importance and the emphasis each 
receives during a peer review.
Independence
The essence of an audit is the independent 
examination of a company’s financial statements 
for the purpose of providing a professional opin­
ion regarding their conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles. Without inde­
pendence, the opinion and the examination have 
little validity or usefulness. Compliance with quality 
control standards therefore requires member firms 
to establish appropriate policies and procedures 
to accomplish the following:
■ Instruct all professional personnel about the inde­
pendence rules, regulations, interpretations, and 
rulings of the AICPA, state CPA society, state board 
of accountancy, state statutes, and, if applicable, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and other
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regulatory agencies; and require personnel to adhere 
to such rules and regulations in the performance of 
their duties.
■ Confirm, when acting as principal auditor, the inde­
pendence of another firm engaged to perform seg­
ments of an engagement.
■ Monitor compliance with policies and procedures 
relating to independence.
Acceptance and Continuance of Clients
Prudence suggests that a firm be selective in 
determining its professional relationships. To 
minimize the likelihood of association with a client 
whose management lacks integrity, a firm should 
adopt policies and procedures for deciding whether 
to accept new clients or continue existing clients. 
This usually includes:
■ Procedures for evaluation of prospective clients and 
for their approval as clients.
■ Evaluation of clients upon occurrence of specified 
events to determine whether the relationship should 
be continued.
Hiring
The quality of a firm’s work ultimately depends 
on the integrity, competence, and motivation of 
personnel who perform and those who supervise 
the performance of the firm’s services. Thus, a 
firm should adopt appropriate policies and pro­
cedures regarding the following:
■ Maintaining a recruiting program designed to obtain 
qualified personnel by planning for personnel needs, 
establishing hiring objectives, and setting qualifi­
cations for those involved in the hiring function.
■ Establishing qualifications and guidelines for eval­
uating potential hirees at each professional level.
■ Informing applicants and new personnel of the 
firm’s policies and procedures relevant to them.
Assigning Personnel to Engagements
Like other professional organizations, ac­
counting firms include within their professional 
staffs practitioners possessing varying degrees of 
experience, knowledge, and skill. Policies and 
procedures for assigning personnel to engage­
ments therefore need to be established to provide 
the firm with reasonable assurance that work will 
be performed by persons having the degree of 
technical training and proficiency required in the 
circumstances. Policies related to this important 
function generally cover
■ The firm’s approach to assigning personnel, in­
cluding the planning of overall firm needs and the
measures employed to achieve a balance of engage­
ment manpower requirements, personnel skills, 
individual development, and utilization.
■ Designation of an appropriate person to be respon­
sible for assigning personnel to engagements.
■ Provision for approval of the scheduling and staff­
ing of each engagement by the person with final re­
sponsibility for the engagement.
Supervision
Audits are typically performed by teams, 
and members of those teams generally have dif­
ferent levels of experience and skill. However, 
one member of the team is assigned final respon­
sibility for the engagement While that individual 
is responsible for the supervision and review of 
individual engagements, the firm is responsible 
for establishing policies and procedures for the 
conduct and supervision of work performed by 
professional staff members at all levels to provide 
reasonable assurance that the work performed 
meets the firm’s standards of quality. The extent 
of supervision and review required depends on 
many factors, including complexity of the subject 
matter, qualifications of the persons performing 
the work, and extent of consultation available and 
used. Firms need to consider providing guidance 
on the following broad matters;
■ Procedures for planning engagements; this covers 
matters such as background information to be ob­
tained, development of work programs and time 
estimates, and assignment of responsibility for 
audit planning.
■ Procedures for maintaining the firm’s standards of 
quality for the work performed; this includes mat­
ters such as audit procedures manuals, standard­
ized forms and checklists, and procedures for 
resolving differences of opinion.
■ Procedures for reviewing engagement workpapers 
and reports; this includes, among other things, con­
sideration of the need for review by a second 
partner.
Consultation
The great variety of professional skill, know­
ledge, and experience within a CPA firm is matched 
by the variety and complexity of the accounting 
and auditing problems faced by staff members. 
When a member of the professional staff, includ­
ing partners, meets with a problem that is new or 
involves unusual complexities, consultation with 
more skilled, knowledgeable, or experienced 
associates helps avoid the possibility of error or 
other inadequacies. Quality control standards
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require that appropriate policies and procedures 
for consultation be established to provide the 
firm with reasonable assurance that its personnel 
will seek assistance, to the extent required, from 
persons having appropriate levels of knowledge, 
competence, judgment, and authority.
The nature of arrangements for consultation 
within a firm depends on a number of factors 
including the size of the firm and the levels of 
knowledge, competence, and judgment possessed 
by the persons performing the work. In deciding 
on the consultation policies and procedures ap­
propriate for its practice, a firm is expected to give 
consideration to the following objectives:
■ Identification of areas and specialized situations 
where consultation is required, and encourage­
ment of personnel to consult with or use authorita­
tive sources on other complex or unusual matters.
■ Designation of individuals to serve as authoritative 
sources, with definition of their authority in con­
sultative situations.
■ Establishment of procedures for resolving differ­
ences of opinion between engagement personnel 
and designated consultants.
■ Specification of the nature and the extent of docu­
mentation necessary to record the results of con­
sultation in those areas and specialized situations 
where consultation is required, and for other con­
sultations as well.
Professional Development
Because business and accounting are both 
dynamic activities involving innovation and change, 
continuing professional education is a necessity 
to keep practitioners abreast of new develop­
ments and to assist staff members to acquire the 
knowledge and skills they need for advancement 
Appropriate professional education and training 
activities enable a firm to provide its personnel 
with the knowledge required to fulfill respon­
sibilities assigned to them and to progress within 
the firm. Because of the importance of continuing 
education to the continued performance of quality 
product, a firm should:
■ Establish guidelines and requirements for the firm’s 
professional development program and communi­
cate them to all members of the professional staff.
■ Supply personnel with information about current 
developments in professional technical standards 
and encourage personnel to engage in self-develop­
ment activities.
■ Provide, to the extent necessary, programs to develop 
expertise in specialized areas and industries in order 
to meet the firm’s needs for such personnel.
■ Provide adequate and effective on-the-job training 
during the performance of engagements.
Advancement
Practices in promoting and otherwise reward­
ing personnel for satisfactory performance have 
important implications for the quality of a firm’s 
work. Quality control standards require a firm to 
give consideration to its needs for measures that
■ Establish the qualifications deemed necessary for 
the various levels of responsibility within the firm.
■ Evaluate performance of personnel and periodically 
advise personnel of their progress.
■ Maintain personnel files containing documenta­
tion relating to the evaluation process.
■ Assign responsibility for making advancement 
decisions.
Inspection
Inspection is a review program conducted 
within a firm under the direction of management 
Compliance with policies and procedures related 
to the eight other elements of the quality control 
system is tested, and engagements from the firm’s 
accounting and auditing practice are reviewed to 
determine whether firm policies and procedures 
have been applied appropriately. Such reviews 
are typically conducted by partners or experienced 
managers and constitute an important feature of 
quality control. In multioffice firms, offices should 
be inspected by teams from other offices. When 
deviations from established practices are dis­
covered, steps should be taken to assure that com­
pliance is obtained in the future.
To assure that inspection is adequate, a firm 
should establish policies that:
■ Define the scope and conduct of its inspection 
program.
■ Provide for reporting inspection findings to man­
agement and for monitoring any actions intended 
to strengthen quality control.
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T he Peer Review Process
Each member firm is required to subject its quality 
control system to review by independent peers at 
least once every three years. A peer review is 
intended to evaluate (1) whether a firm’s system 
of quality control for its accounting and auditing 
practice is appropriately comprehensive and suit­
ably designed for its needs, (2) whether its quality 
control policies and procedures are adequately 
documented and communicated to professional 
personnel, (3) whether such policies and proce­
dures are being complied with, and (4) whether 
the firm is complying with the membership re­
quirements of the Section.
A member firm is required to provide to the 
review team the following background informa­
tion: (1) documentation that describes or sum­
marizes the policies and procedures constituting 
its quality control system, (2) a description of the 
firm’s organization (including an organization 
chart), and (3) other descriptive material relating 
to the elements of quality control and the firm’s 
operations.
General Considerations 
in a Peer Review
Administration of the peer review program 
is the responsibility of the Section’s Peer Review 
Committee. A peer review is conducted with due 
regard for requirements of confidentiality imposed 
by the rules of conduct of the code of professional 
ethics of the AICPA. Care is taken to assure that 
none of the reviewed firm’s clients are identified 
in the workpapers or in any way made public.
The Review Team
A review team may be appointed by the 
Committee, may be formed by a member firm 
engaged by the firm under review, or may be 
formed by an association or state CPA society 
authorized to administer peer reviews. The review 
team captain directs the organization and con­
duct of the review, supervises other reviewers, 
and is responsible for preparation of a report on 
the review and, where applicable, suggestions for 
improving the firm’s quality control system. Only
partners currently involved in the audit function 
are eligible to serve as review team captains.
All members of the review team must be 
independent with respect to the firm to be reviewed. 
Reciprocal reviews between firms are not permit­
ted. Any relationship between the reviewed firm 
and members of the review team that implies a 
lack of independence is considered by the Peer 
Review Committee.
Review teams must have knowledge of the 
type of practice to be reviewed, including exper­
tise in specialized industries in which the firm 
practices. In the case of firms with SEC practices, 
review teams must consist of persons who are 
knowledgeable about current SEC rules and 
regulations.
The review team is expected to carry out the 
review in a professional manner similar to that of 
an independent accountant examining financial 
statements.
Performing the Field Review
A peer review has four distinct phases:
1. Study and evaluation of the firm’s quality 
control system.
2. Review for compliance with the firm’s 
quality control policies and procedures at 
each organizational or functional level 
within the firm, including review of work- 
paper files and reports for selected ac­
counting and auditing engagements.
3. Review of the firm’s compliance with 
membership requirements of the Section.
4. Preparation of a written report and, where 
applicable, a letter on matters that may 
require action by the firm.
Chart D provides an overview of the peer 
review process.
Extent o f Review Team’s Tests
In a review of a multioffice firm, the selec­
tion of practice offices for review needs to be suffi­
cient to evaluate whether the firm’s quality control 
policies and procedures are adequately com­
municated to professional personnel and whether
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they are being complied with. While the number 
and location of practice offices to be selected 
requires the exercise of judgment, guidelines to 
aid the review team captain in making that judg­
ment are contained in the SECPS Manual as 
follows:
Approxim ate num ber of 
Num ber of offices offices to be selected
in reviewed firm for review
2 to 15 Largest office plus 1 to 3 offices
Over 15 15% to 25% of the reviewed firm’s
offices (the selected offices should 
contain similar percentages of the firm’s 
professional personnel and the firm’s 
accounting and auditing hours)
The number of offices and the accounting 
and auditing engagements to be selected for review, 
which reflects, among other things, a judgm ent as 
to the percentage of accounting and auditing hours 
to be reviewed, is affected by the size and nature 
of the firm’s practice. The objective is to obtain a 
reasonable cross-section of the firm’s practice 
although greater weight is given to publicly-held 
clients, to large and complex clients, and to initial 
audit engagements. The review team’s evaluation 
of the firm’s inspection program also affects the 
selection process.
In evaluating the firm’s inspection program, 
the review team considers such factors as whether 
the inspection team’s workpapers adequately 
document findings and conclusions, and whether 
the report of the inspection team is consistent 
with those findings and conclusions. The review 
team tests the findings and conclusions of the 
firm’s inspection team in order to determine whe­
ther the firm is adequately monitoring its quality 
controls and whether reliance can be placed on 
the inspection function. These tests may be ac­
complished by comparison of the findings of the 
review team with those of the inspection team, by 
direct observation of inspection procedures, or 
by follow-up review of one or more offices in­
spected by the inspection team.
The objectives of the review of engagements 
are to evaluate (1) whether there has been com­
pliance by personnel of the firm with its quality 
control policies and procedures in the perfor­
mance of accounting and auditing services and (2) 
whether the quality control policies adopted and 
procedures established by the firm are appro­
priately comprehensive and suitably designed. 
Guidelines for determining the extent of engage­
ment testing are provided in the SECPS Manual:
Percentage o f review ed firm ’s 
N um ber of offices total accounting and auditing
in review ed firm hours to be reviewed
1 to 15 5%  to 10%
Over 15 3%  to 6%
Chart D depicts the peer review process as it 
relates to the review of selected accounting and 
auditing engagements.
Review Team Workpapers
The review team members document in 
workpapers the review procedures performed 
and their findings, including matters that indicate 
deficiencies in the firm’s quality control policies 
and procedures or significant lack of compliance 
therewith. At the conclusion of the fieldwork, a 
summary review memorandum is prepared that, 
among other things, covers (1) the planning of the 
review, (2) the qualifications of the review team 
members, (3) the scope of the work performed, (4) 
the findings and type of report to be issued together 
with reasons supporting the report, (5) whether a 
letter of comments is to be issued and if not, why 
not, and (6) comments communicated orally to 
management of the firm that were not deemed of 
sufficient significance to include in a letter of 
comments.
Reporting on Peer Reviews
Peer Review Report
The review team’s report includes a state­
ment of the scope of the review, a description of 
the general characteristics of a system of quality 
control, and the team’s opinion— or a disclaimer 
of opinion—as to whether the reviewed firm’s 
quality control system met the objectives of estab­
lished quality control standards and was being 
complied with to provide the firm with reason­
able assurance of conforming with professional 
standards and the membership requirements of 
the Section.
An unqualified report indicates the reviewed 
team’s satisfaction with the firm’s system and with 
compliance with the system and the membership 
requirements of the Section. Most reports have 
been unqualified.
A report is modified in the following circum­
stances:
1. The review discloses significant deficien­
cies in the firm’s quality control policies 
and procedures.
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2. The review discloses a significant lack of 
compliance with the firm’s quality con­
trol policies and procedures.
3. The review discloses a significant lack of 
compliance with the other membership 
requirements of the Section.
4. The scope of the review is limited so as to 
preclude the application of review pro­
cedures considered necessary.
A modified report may express a qualified 
opinion, or an adverse opinion, or it may include a 
disclaimer of opinion. A qualified opinion iden­
tifies significant deficiencies in the system or in 
compliance with the system. An adverse opinion 
indicates that the system is not adequate, that 
compliance with the system is not adequate, or 
both. A disclaimer of opinion is issued when 
limitations placed on the scope are so significant 
that the review team cannot form an overall opi­
nion. No disclaimers of opinion have been issued 
to date.
Exit Conference
Prior to issuance of its formal report, the 
review team is required to communicate its con­
clusions to the reviewed firm. Ordinarily, this 
takes place at an “exit conference” attended by 
appropriate members of the review team and the 
reviewed firm. The review team captain also notifies 
the Peer Review Committee in advance of the 
scheduled meeting in order to permit represen­
tatives of the Committee and the Public Oversight 
Board to attend the meeting if they so elect. The 
Board’s policy is to attend exit conferences of all 
firms with five or more SEC clients and, on a ran­
dom sample basis, exit conferences of firms with 
fewer than five SEC clients, including firms with 
no SEC clients.
At an exit conference, the parties discuss the 
review team’s conclusions, the report to be issued, 
any matters that may require corrective action, 
and other suggestions for improving the firm’s 
quality controls. In the review of a multioffice 
firm, an exit conference is held at the completion 
of the review team’s work at each office. Board 
members and staff also attend these conferences 
on a random sample basis.
Letter of Comments
During the course of the review, the review 
team may discover matters that it believes require 
action by the firm, either because modifications 
in its practices would result in substantial im­
provement in its quality control policies and pro­
cedures, or in its compliance with them, or with 
the membership requirements of the Section. A 
letter of comments, therefore, is always issued 
when the review results in a modified report 
Such matters are candidly discussed at the exit 
conference and are incorporated in a formal letter 
of comments which is issued simultaneously with 
the report on the peer review.
The reviewed firm is required to respond in 
writing to each item included in the letter of com­
ments. Its response describes actions taken or 
planned with respect to each deficiency or recom­
mended improvement noted. If the firm dis­
agrees with the conclusions of the review team, its 
response describes the reasons for such dis­
agreement.
A letter of comments has been issued on over 90 
percent of the reviews performed to date. See 
Table 1. The best possible report a firm can 
receive is an unqualified report with no letter of 
comments. The Peer Review Committee care­
fully considers the deficiencies discussed in a let­
ter of comments and the firm’s response as part of 
its evaluation of the appropriateness of an unquali­
fied report and in deciding whether a qualified 
opinion or an adverse opinion is appropriate 
when a firm is found to have significant deficien­
cies in its system or in compliance with the sys­
tem. These evaluations and discussions require 
mature and thoughtful judgment, because there 
are no quantitative criteria that can be used to 
measure the significance of perceived deficiencies.
Peer Review Committee Supervision
The Committee’s role in the peer review pro­
cess is an active one. Chart D illustrates Peer Review 
Committee processing of peer review reports. A 
peer review report is not considered official 
until it has been accepted by the Peer Review 
Committee. Every report, letter of comments,  
and accompanying response receives the atten­
tion, first, of an evaluation subcommittee, and 
subsequently the full Committee. Unqualified 
reports not accompanied by a letter of comments 
are accepted by the Committee only when the 
Committee, upon review of the findings, concurs 
that a letter of comments is unnecessary. If there 
is an apparent inconsistency between a review 
team’s findings and its report, the Committee 
pursues the matter until resolved. For example, 
the Committee may question the review team 
about the factors it considered in deciding on the 
type of report issued, may review the review team’s 
workpapers, or may require the review team to
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revisit the firm and perform additional pro­
cedures to substantiate its conclusions.
If the Committee concurs with the report 
issued and decides that no additional corrective 
action is necessary, the report, the letter of com­
ments, and the firm’s response are accepted by 
the Committee. If corrective action on the part of 
the firm is required but not yet taken, a Commit­
tee member may be assigned to monitor the firm’s 
implementation of its corrective action plan. When 
the Committee has assurance that the necessary 
corrective actions have been taken, the report is 
accepted by the Committee.
In certain circumstances, the Committee ac­
cepts a report only upon agreement by the firm in 
writing to stipulated conditions, such as a revisit 
by the review team or a Committee member to 
review the corrective actions deemed necessary or 
a requirement for another full scope review the 
following year.
The Committee can and does exercise con­
siderable influence in requiring improvements in 
quality control when it considers such to be neces­
sary. Much of the strength of the self-regulatory 
program comes from the rigor with which the 
Peer Review Committee performs its several 
duties.
Board Oversight
Because of the importance of peer review in
the overall self-regulatory program, the Board 
and its staff devote a significant amount of time to 
monitoring all aspects of the process. The Board’s 
views are sought on all proposed changes and its 
comments on individual reviews are considered 
by the Committee in deciding on whether the 
review was performed and reported on in accor­
dance with standards.
Each peer review is subjected to direct Board 
oversight Three levels of monitoring are used: (1) 
review of the report, letter of comments (LOC), 
letter of response (LOR), and selected review team 
workpapers; (2) review of the report, LOC, LOR, 
and all review team workpapers; and (3) all of the 
procedures in (2) and observation of the review in 
progress and attendance at the exit conference.
Public Access to Peer Review Reports
Upon acceptance by the Committee, the review 
team’s report and letter of comments, together 
with the reviewed firm’s response, are deposited in 
files available to the public at the AICPA offices in 
New York City. When a report is accepted subject 
to stipulated conditions, relevant correspondence 
or a memorandum to that effect is also placed in 
the public file.
Table 1 is a summary of the findings of peer 
reviews since the establishment of the Division 
for CPA Firms.
TABLE 1 Peer Review Reports A ccepted by the SECPS and
PCPS Peer Review Committees Since Inception
TYPE OF OPINION
Unqualified Qualified Adverse Total
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent
SEC Practice Section
Initial peer reviews 377 83.6% 61 13.5% 13 2.9% 451 100%
Subsequent peer reviews 152 93.3 10 6.1 1 0.6 163 100
529 86.2 71 11.5 14 2.3 614 100
Private Companies 
Practice Section*
Initial peer reviews 806 87.3 99 10.7 18 2.0 923 100
Subsequent peer reviews 54 93.1 4 6.9 — — 58 100
860 87.7 103 10.5 18 1.8 981 100
Combined Total for 
Division for CPA Firms
Initial peer reviews 1,183 86.1 160 11.6 31 2.3 1,374 100
Subsequent peer reviews 206 93.3 14 6.2 1 0.5 221 100
1,389 87.1% 174 10.9% 32 2.0% 1,595 100%
* The Public Oversight Board does not oversee the activities of the Private Companies Practice Section. These data regarding peer reviews of 
this Section were obtained from the PCPS Peer Review Committee.
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Tables 2 ,  3, and 4 are analyses of reviews 
of SECPS member firms. Table 2 shows a signifi­
cant decrease in the num ber of firms receiving 
modified reports in 1983 as compared with 
earlier years.
TABLE 2 Summary of Types o f Peer Review Reports Issued  




No. Percent No. Percent
Firms receiving unqualified opinion
with no letter of comments 51 8.3% 17 12.0%
Firms receiving unqualified opinion
and a letter of comments 478 77.8 116 82.3
Firms receiving qualified opinion 71 11.6 7 5.0
Firms receiving adverse opinion 14 2.3 1 0.7
614 100% 141 100%
Table 3 summarizes corrective actions required 
by the SECPS Peer Review Committee during the 
most recent three-year cycle regarding audit en­
gagements found not to have been performed in 
accordance with professional standards. Table 4
TABLE 3 Corrective Action Required by SECPS Peer
Review C om m ittee With Respect to 
Substandard Audit Engagements Identified  
in Peer Reviews Perform ed During M ost
Recent Three-Year Cycle
Number of audit engagements reviewed.................................3,247
Number of audit engagements considered substandard 
by peer reviewers ...................................................................  95
(2.9% )
Corrective Action Required
Audit report recalled and financial statements revised
and reissued............................................................................. 17
Omitted auditing procedures performed ................................. 12
Omitted auditing procedures— firm has not yet informed
Committee of actions to be ta ke n *.......................................  3
Cause of impairment of independence eliminated................  4
Questionable GAAS and GAAP treatment to be improved in 
subsequent y e a r ......................................................................  59
Total ..........................  95
* Engagements identified in review processed by Committee in 
March 1984.
summarizes follow-up actions required by the 
SECPS Peer Review Committee during the past 
three years to assure that firms made the necessary 
improvements in their quality control systems. 
Since the peer review requirement is triennial, 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize generally the results of 
all member firms except those that have joined 
within the past few months.
TABLE 4 Sum m ary o f Com m ittee Actions to Assure
Im plem entation o f Quality Control Improvements 
in Connection with SECPS Peer Reviews During 
the M ost R ecent Three-Year Cycle
N um ber o f
Type o f Action Stipulated by the C om m ittee Follow -up Actions
Firms required to undergo an accelerated peer review:
Firms receiving adverse opinions............................  7
Firms receiving qualified opinions .......................... 9
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Firms required to allow a revisit by peer reviewer 
or Committee member to review effectiveness
of corrective action:
Firms receiving adverse opinions............................  1
Firms receiving qualified opinions .......................... 9
Firms receiving unqualified opinions with 
letter of com m ents.................................................  8
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As indicated, while the thrust of a peer review 
is to identify deficiencies in a firm’s system of 
quality control, the process also identifies engage­
ments which are determined not to have been 
performed in accordance with professional stan­
dards. These instances are reported promptly to 
the Committee, which follows up each instance to 
ascertain that appropriate action is taken. In cases 
where the financial statements were determined 
not in accordance with generally accepted ac­
counting principles, the firm recalled its report 
and the financial statements were reissued, or if 
the report was given limited distribution, the firm 
agreed to cause the deficiencies to be corrected in 
the subsequent year’s report.
In those instances where it was concluded 
that the audit was not performed in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards, the 
firm either immediately performed the omitted 
procedures or agreed to perform them in a subse­
quent imminent audit
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Investigation of Alleged Audit Failures
No system of quality control can guarantee that a 
firm will never issue an inappropriate report. 
Management fraud, mistakes of judgment, mis­
understanding of instructions, carelessness, and 
other personal factors may result in “audit failures” 
no matter how rigorous the system of quality con­
trol. Neither can peer review, the heart of the 
AICPA’s self-regulatory program, which is neces­
sarily and appropriately performed on a sam­
pling basis, be expected to disclose all personnel 
failures. A peer review is designed to provide 
reasonable, not absolute, assurance that the firm’s 
accounting and auditing engagements are per­
formed in compliance with professional standards.
Therefore, certain allegations of audit failure 
are assigned for investigation to the Special Inves­
tigations Committee which considers whether 
they result from a “people problem,” a systems 
failure, or an inadequacy in professional stan­
dards, and considers what steps, if any, need to be 
taken to protect the public from a future failure. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission has 
made the following comment:
Although peer reviews provide no assur­
ance that all audit failures will be identified 
or avoided in the future, any audit failures 
that occur should be due to isolated break­
downs or “people problems,” and not to 
inherent deficiencies in firms’ systems of 
quality control.4
The Committee consists of nine experienced 
auditors, some retired and some still active, whose 
work complements and supplements the peer 
review process.
Confidentiality of Committee Activities
When the Special Investigations Committee 
was formed, it was recognized that any public dis­
closure of its activities regarding a particular firm 
or case could be used to the prejudice of that firm. 
This could be unfair to the firm because the pur­
pose of the Committee’s action (i.e., to improve 
the quality of audits) would be quite different 
from that of litigation (i.e., to ascertain fault and
4 Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report, 1982, U.S. Govern­
ment Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.
impose liability). Moreover, the proceedings of 
the Committee ordinarily would not result in 
authoritative findings of fact based on study of all 
the facts. As a result, the authorization document 
establishing the Committee required that all its 
activities be performed in strict confidence. Meet­
ings of the Committee are open only to assigned 
AICPA staff members and representatives of the 
Public Oversight Board. Workpapers are destroyed 
after they have served their purposes in the Com­
mittee’ s decision-making process and oversight is 
complete. No publicity of any kind is given to any 
of the Committee’s activities. This policy of confi­
dentiality does not restrict the effectiveness of the 
Committee in carrying out its intended purpose.
Allegations of audit failure in litigation or 
regulatory proceedings unavoidably raise ques­
tions about the adequacy of a firm’s system of 
quality control. Whether the allegations are well 
founded or not, the mere existence of such charges 
requires the attention of those concerned with 
that firm’s quality controls. Provision for the in­
vestigation of allegations of audit failure is included 
in the membership requirements of the SEC 
Practice Section. Member firms must promptly 
report each instance of litigation or other regulatory 
proceeding against the firm or any of its person­
nel, involving clients that are SEC registrants alleg­
ing deficiencies in the conduct of an audit or 
reporting thereon in a filing under the federal 
securities laws. Although the Committee currently 
does not have jurisdiction under its charter for 
allegations involving entities that are not SEC 
registrants, the Executive Committee can require 
a member firm to comply with the Committee’s 
request for information if the Committee feels 
such allegations require investigation. To date, 
the Executive Committee has not had to take such 
action because member firms have voluntarily 
complied with all requests of the Committee.5
Allegations made in litigation may or may
5
In Ju n e  1984, the SECPS Review Committee, a committee appoin­
ted by the Chairman of the AICPA to review the structure, opera­
tions, and effectiveness of the SEC Practice Section, issued its 
report, recommending, among other things, that the membership 
requirement for reporting cases to the Committee be extended to 
cover cases involving all entities in which there is a significant 
public interest.
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not have any foundation in fact If valid, they 
may imply deficiencies in the firm’s system of 
quality control or in professional literature, or 
they may imply a failure by the firm’s personnel 
to carry out their assigned duties in a pro­
fessional manner.
The possibilities with respect to a set of alle­
gations are several and varied. From the stand­
point of quality control:
1. They may be based on misunderstanding 
by the plaintiff of accounting and/or audit­
ing standards.
2. They may represent a failure attributable
to the independent accountants-----
a. Because of a personnel deficiency.
b. Because of a systems deficiency.
3. They may indicate the need for recon­
sideration of professional standards.
If the charges are determined to represent a 
misunderstanding of accounting and/or auditing 
standards, the case is closed. If it appears that 
there may have been a failure by specific mem­
bers of the firm’s professional staff to follow estab­
lished policies and procedures, rather than weak­
nesses in the firm’s system of quality control, the 
Committee considers whether corrective action 
taken by the firm is appropriate to guard against 
the possibility of a future failure. However, it will 
leave the task of fixing responsibility and punish­
ment to the courts and regulatory bodies which 
are much better equipped to do so.
If the Committee identifies system weak­
nesses as a result of its investigative procedures 
and these have already been eliminated by cor­
rective action taken by the firm, the case will be 
closed. If weaknesses in the firm’s system of quality 
control have not yet been corrected, recommen­
dations for improvement will be discussed with 
the firm. If agreement cannot be reached with the 
firm on appropriate improvements in the system, 
the facts will be reported to the Executive Com­
mittee for appropriate action, which might involve 
the imposition of sanctions.
Chart E depicts the process of investigation 
of allegations by the Committee. The Board has 
complete access to all Committee files and actively 
monitors the Committee’s decisions on individual 
cases. The Board’s staff reads all pertinent docu­
ments, financial information, and correspon­
dence related to reported cases. Summaries of 
each case are distributed to Board members and 
serve as a basis for discussion at Board meetings.
Representatives of the Board attend all Commit­
tee meetings and, at the Board’s discretion, meet­
ings between firm representatives and Committee 
members, as described below.
The Investigative Process
For each reported case, the member firm is 
required to provide the Committee’s staff with 
copies of the complaint, relevant financial state­
ments, SEC or other regulatory filings, and, upon 
request, other public documents such as special 
reports of bankruptcy trustees. As part of its regular 
duties, the Committee’s staff reads the financial 
press and business and SEC publications for re­
ports of alleged audit failures. In this manner, the 
staff usually becomes aware of matters to be re­
ported before member firms formally report them 
and identifies alleged audit failures involving non- 
SEC registrants that may have significant public 
interest. The staff prepares a summary of such 
documents, identifying the accounting, auditing, 
and quality control issues involved, and includes 
a summary of or references to relevant pro­
fessional literature. The staff summary and copies 
of the documents are supplied to all Committee 
members.
At the Committee meeting following the re­
porting of a case, a task force of one or two Com­
mittee members is appointed to consider the alle­
gations and relevant documents and to recom­
mend what other investigative procedures should 
be applied.
The task force carefully(l) reviews all mate­
rials relevant to the case such as the complaint, 
the financial statements, and filings with the SEC 
and other regulatory agencies; (2) considers the 
results of the most recent peer review; and (3) 
reads available public information ranging from 
newspaper articles to court documents. The task 
force reports on its activities at each Committee 
meeting.
In some instances, a thoughtful reading of 
the complaint and related financial statements 
permits the task force to conclude that the allega­
tions are without merit and that no further action 
by the Committee is warranted. For example, this 
conclusion might follow when the complaint al­
leges inadequate financial statement disclosures 
although all required disclosures are clearly evi­
dent from a reading of the statements. However, a 
decision to close a case requires formal action by 
the Committee, an action which the Committee 
does not take lightly. The task force proposing 
such an action presents supporting facts and rea­
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soning to the Committee and is often questioned 
at some length. Even though a majority of the 
Committee may agree with the task force’s recom­
mendation, it is not unusual for the Committee to 
defer action on a recommendation to close a case 
and to ask the task force to obtain additional 
information regarding some aspect of the charges.
The task force may decide that it needs addi­
tional information in the course of its work or, as 
indicated above, the Committee may require that 
additional information be obtained. Conferences 
with representatives of the firm and with the cap­
tain or members of the latest peer review team are 
common means of obtaining such information. 
The specifics of each case influence the kinds of 
information sought in such conferences, but the 
most commonly requested information includes:
■ The firm’s general assessment of the allegations and 
its basis for such assessment.
■ The current responsibilities of the partner(s) and 
manager(s) who supervised the audit engagement 
involved in the litigation.
■ Whether the audit team on the engagement sought 
consultation with others within the firm regarding 
matters that are the subject of the litigation.
■ Current policies and procedures regarding aspects 
of the quality control system challenged by the 
litigation.
■ Whether the office issuing the report in question 
had recently been subjected to (a) peer review or (b) 
the firm’s internal inspection program, and, if so, 
whether the work of the supervisory personnel in­
volved in the engagement under litigation had been 
subjected to review or inspection.
■ The nature and scope of supervision and guidance 
in specialized industries, if relevant to the case.
■ The issues underlying matters mentioned in a peer 
review report or letter of comments.
After thorough consideration of the infor­
mation gathered, the Committee decides if there 
appears a need to continue or expand its inquiry. 
In a significant number of cases, the information 
gathered through the procedures described above 
has enabled the Committee to conclude that the 
case can be closed.
Moreover, in a number of cases, the Com­
mittee learns that the firm itself has already reviewed 
the matter, and, if desirable or necessary, has 
strengthened or emphasized relevant quality con­
trol policies and procedures and/or reassigned 
certain responsibilities. In large measure, experi­
ence to date has provided convincing evidence 
that private regulation by individual firms is effec­
tive in implementing timely and appropriate cor­
rective action—that is, once litigation or some 
other proceeding alerts a firm to possible weak­
nesses, it acts on its own initiative to discover and 
correct any deficiency in its quality control system.
Monitoring
When the Committee decides that relevant 
additional information may be forthcoming, a 
case may be placed in monitoring to await the 
results of certain activities then in process. In 
effect, monitoring represents an extension of time 
to complete the investigation, an extension made 
necessary by indications that additional informa­
tion may become available. For example, the 
Committee may decide that the input from the 
results of a firm’s then in-process peer review or 
the imminent report of a bankruptcy trustee may 
be relevant to deciding the Committee’s future 
course of action. The Committee may also decide 
to keep the case in monitoring status until it can 
evaluate the effectiveness of relevant corrective 
actions by the firm. As further information be­
comes available, the task force assigned to the 
case will generally discuss these developments 
with representatives of the member firm or the 
peer review team.
Special Reviews
The Committee’s concern with a specific set 
of allegations always runs to their possible impli­
cations with respect to the firm’s system of quality 
control, not to the validity of the allegations in the 
case. The Section recognizes that the courts, the 
SEC, and others which possess relevant statutory 
powers will ultimately decide the merits of the 
allegations and impose a formal penalty, if one is 
called for. The Committee’s responsibility is to 
gain assurance that the firm remedies any defi­
ciencies in its quality control system or in its com­
pliance with that system that might lead to future 
failures.
When the Committee concludes that the 
allegations may be indicative of unsatisfactory 
quality controls or unsatisfactory compliance, it 
calls for a special review of one or more aspects of 
the firm’s quality control system. This has occurred, 
to date, in five cases involving four different firms. 
Note that this is a special review in addition to the 
required triennial peer review. A special review 
differs from a peer review in that it is typically less 
extensive and more intensive. The special review 
generally is directed at those elements of quality 
control implied by the allegations to have deficien­
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CHART E A ctiv itie s  o f  S p e c ia l In v e s tig a tio n s  C o m m itte e
Reporting Phase and Summary 
of issues by Committee Staff
Member firm reports litigation 
to Special Investigations 
Committee
Member firm provides copies 
of complaints, SEC filings and 
releases, financial statements 
and other pertinent public 
documents
Staff reviews submitted 
material and relevant 
professional literature
Staff summarizes relevant 
allegations, issues, and 
prepares recommendations for 
Committee action
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cies. Depending on the nature of the allegations, 
the special review may focus on the work of specific 
practice offices, of specific partners or staff mem­
bers, or on engagements of clients in a specific 
industry.
In each review of the four firms required to 
undergo special reviews of selected aspects of 
their quality control systems, the special review 
team was supervised by the Committee’s assigned 
task force. The reviews of three firms focused on 
the performance of audits in a specific industry 
and in designated offices by specific individuals. 
The review of the fourth firm was directed at 
audits of significant SEC registrants performed 
by specific practice offices; special attention was 
directed to selected key audit aspects of the en­
gagements selected.
The workpapers and reports of the special 
review teams were reviewed by the task force. The 
results of each review were reported in detail to 
the Committee. Two of the special reviews resulted 
in the conclusion that each firm’s quality controls 
were appropriate, that relevant policies and pro­
cedures were being complied with, but that in 
certain offices audit procedures and the basis for 
conclusions reached were not always fully docu­
mented. In each case, the firm had discussed the 
findings of the special review team with personnel 
of the offices concerned and reemphasized the 
need for compliance with the firm’s documentation 
standards. Accordingly, the Committee closed its 
files on both cases.
The special review of the third firm did not 
uncover any deficiencies in its quality control sys­
tem or any significant instances of noncom­
pliance by its personnel with established policies 
and procedures. The Committee closed the case.
The special review of the fourth firm dis­
closed that compliance with the firm’s quality 
control policies and procedures in one of the 
offices reviewed was not satisfactory. On dis­
covering this, the firm developed a comprehen­
sive corrective action plan for improving the quality 
of performance in that office. The plan was con­
sidered adequate by the Committee. Neverthe­
less, the Committee directed the peer review team 
then planning the firm’s regularly scheduled re­
view to include that specific office in the review 
and to assess the effectiveness of the corrective 
action plan. The case remains in monitoring status 
pending the Committee’s determination that the 
corrective action plan has achieved its objectives.
The involvement of the Board in special re­
views is similar to that of its involvement in peer 
reviews. For example, the task force’s workpapers
and report are reviewed in detail by the Board’s 
staff; Board and staff members attend meetings 
between firm representatives and review team 
members; Board and staff members attend Com­
mittee meetings at which the findings of and the 
report of the task force are presented for accep­
tance; and the result of each special review is dis­
cussed at Board meetings.
Effects of Private Regulation
The fact that the Committee has seen the 
need to require only four special reviews is attri­
butable to the effective role played by private 
regulation. Often the need for a special review is 
made unnecessary by positive actions taken by 
the firm on its own initiative, as illustrated by the 
following case.
In response to inquiries made in connection 
with certain litigation, the Committee was informed 
that the firm had begun an extensive and inten­
sive intrafirm review (i.e., inspection) of engage­
ments performed by the firm in a specific industry. 
As a result of its special internal inspection pro­
gram, among other things, the firm (1) established 
new requirements for the extent of involvement 
of independent preissuance reviewers for future 
audits of clients in that industry, (2) established 
more extensive consultation procedures with re­
spect to performance of audits of clients in that 
industry, and (3) designed and presented addi­
tional training courses for all supervisory person­
nel assigned to audits of clients in that industry. 
The task force reviewed the report and support­
ing workpapers of the inspection team and the 
resulting modification of the firm’s quality con­
trol policies and procedures and concluded that 
no further action was required. The Committee 
concurred.
Other cases have been closed for similar 
reasons. Actions taken by firms and found to con­
stitute a sufficient basis for the Committee to 
close its files include: (a) transfer of personnel 
and reassignment of responsibilities, (b) expan­
sion of review procedures, including preissuance 
review of audit workpapers, (c) modifying scope 
of inspection program to include selected offices 
named in litigation, and (d) disseminating specific 
guidance material.
Summary of Bases for Cases Closed
Provisions of the charter creating the Special 
Investigations Committee preclude the public re­
porting of detailed information about individual
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cases reported to the Committee. Because the 
Committee does not reach a conclusive deter­
mination of the merits of an allegation of audit 
failure, publication of its actions with respect to 
specific issues could result in unwarranted, sub­
stantial prejudice to member firms or their per­
sonnel. However, Table 5, which summarizes the 
actions taken and conclusions reached by the 
Committee, may provide some insight as to the 
quality of decisions reached.
Reevaluation of Professional Standards
While the major task of the Committee is to 
investigate each set of allegations made against a 
member firm in the course of litigation, the Com­
mittee also performs another very useful function 
that benefits both the public and the profession. 
The nature of the Committee’s work enables it to 
analyze and evaluate the implications for current 
professional standards of each piece of litigation 
that comes before it. It unavoidably asks the ques­
tion on each case: “ Does the information in this 
case imply that current professional literature 
does not provide adequate technical guidance on 
this matter?”
In a real sense, the Committee’s analysis serves 
as an early warning system to identify matters 
requiring the attention of those charged with the 
responsibility of considering the need for new 
standards or the reconsideration of existing ones.
The Committee has filled this valuable role a 
number of times in its rather brief history, and 
has drawn attention to accounting or auditing 
problems in three specialized industries. For ex­
ample, the Committee suggested that the AICPA’s 
Bank Audit Guide provide further guidance con­
cerning procedures to determine the appropriate 
carrying value of securities whose market value is 
significantly below cost.
TABLE 5 Summary o f Actions Taken and
Conclusions Reached by the Special 
Investigations Com m ittee Concerning 
Closed Cases
N um ber o f Cases Closed  
from Inception to 
June 30, 1984
The allegations misstated the requirements of 
professional standards or the case did not indicate a 
need for changes in the firm’s quality control system or 
for other corrective m easures............................................  66
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies were asked to 
consider the need for changes in or additional guidance 
on professional standards...................................................  9
The case was referred to the AICPA Professional Ethics 
Division for an investigation into the work of a specific 
individual ...............................................................................  2
A special review or an expansion of the firm’s regularly 
scheduled forthcoming peer review was m a d e ..............  6
The firm took appropriate corrective action that was 
responsive to the implications of the specific case . . . .  10
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O ther Membership Requirements
A firm may join the SEC Practice Section by sub­
mitting an application for membership and agree­
ing to abide by the membership requirements. 
The requirements of membership are many and 
diverse.6 Several of them are described at length 
in other sections of this report, such as the trien­
nial peer review and the need to report certain 
litigation alleging audit failure by the firm or any 
of its members. The requirements of members 
are reproduced in an appendix to this report, but 
several of them are worthy of special note:
1. The engagement partner charged with 
the responsibility of supervising the audit 
of an SEC registrant can serve in that capa­
city for no more than seven consecutive 
years. This requirement is waived for firms 
with fewer than five SEC audit clients and 
fewer than ten partners.
2. Every audit report of an SEC registrant 
must be subjected to a preissuance review 
by a partner other than the partner in 
charge of the audit engagement.
3. A member firm is required to maintain 
minimum amounts and types of accoun­
tants’ liability insurance, which amounts 
are in direct proportion to its size.
4. A member firm is required to report to 
the audit committee or board of directors 
of each SEC audit client on the nature of 
disagreements with management of the 
client on financial accounting and report­
ing matters and auditing procedures which, 
if not satisfactorily resolved, would have 
caused the issuance of a qualified opinion 
on the financial statements of the client.
Peer review teams use special procedures to 
ascertain whether the firm is complying with each 
membership requirement If the review team con­
cludes that the firm is not in substantial com­
pliance with the membership requirements, it 
issues a modified report on the peer review, which, 
as indicated earlier, is placed in the public file.
6 Membership requirements of the Private Companies Practice Sec­
tion are similar to those of the SEC Practice Section. The major dif­
ference is that the SEC Practice Section has additional requirements 
that apply only to audits of SEC registrants.
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Oversight of the 
Self-Regulatory Process
The Role of the Public Oversight Board
The Public Oversight Board is a five-member 
board established to represent the public interest 
in the Section’s self-regulatory process. It has 
entry to all meetings of all committees and task 
forces of the Section and access to all workpapers, 
reports, and other documents.
The Board’s primary function is to monitor 
and comment on the Section’s activities. From 
the beginning, the Board has taken the position 
that if the self- regulatory program is to be success­
ful, all authority must be vested in the profession 
itself. The Board does not have line authority and 
does not desire it.
Individual Board members are assigned liai­
son responsibilities with each of the Section’s 
committees. Members of the Board and/or its 
staff attend all committee meetings of the Sec­
tion, and most meetings of its task forces.
The Board publishes an annual report as of 
June 30 each year summarizing its activities and 
reporting on the activities of the Section. The 
Board also occasionally publishes special reports 
as it deems necessary or desirable.7
Oversight by the SEC
The SEC independently evaluates the peer 
review process including the effectiveness of Board 
oversight. The SEC inspects a sample of peer 
reviewer workpapers and Board oversight work- 
papers under an arrangement agreed to by the 
Section. All workpapers are masked so as not to 
reveal the identity of individual clients. Under a
7
In March 1979, the Board published its report, Scope of Services by 
CPA Firms based on its findings of a two-day public hearing and 
numerous written comments from persons both within and out­
side the profession.
1982 modification of that arrangement, work- 
papers relating to firms with fewer than ten SEC 
clients are masked to conceal the identity of the 
firm in order to further reduce the possibility of 
client identification.
The SEC continues to have a high level of 
interest in the program and has actively supported 
it by both constructive suggestion and public 
endorsement Based, on its inspection of the peer 
review process, as described above, the SEC has 
expressed satisfaction with the process and the 
effectiveness of the Board’s oversight procedures 
with respect thereto.
The Board and its staff meet periodically 
with the chairman and staff members of the SEC 
to discuss the various aspects of the self-regulatory 
program. In these meetings, operating under the 
privacy requirement imposed on the special in­
vestigative process, the Section and the Board 
have attempted to provide sufficient information 
to the SEC so as to permit it to have confidence in 
the effectiveness of the process and the Board’s 
oversight thereof. However, the SEC believes that 
it needs additional information to reach an inde­
pendent conclusion regarding the special inves­
tigative process. Exploratory discussions attempting 
to resolve this matter are continuing between the 
Section, the SEC, and the Board.
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Conclusion
As noted in the introduction, professional 
regulation is a complex process in which three 
“authorities” participate, the government, the 
profession, and the firm. The Board has come to 
realize that the most substantial, and certainly the 
least recognized, force for improvement of pro­
fessional performance is private regulation, the 
discipline imposed by management of individual 
firms as they strive to meet the demands of com­
petition and to comply with or exceed pro­
fessional standards.
Professional standards, established at the 
second level of professional regulation, have a 
direct impact on the discipline maintained within 
firms.
The Board has reviewed the accounting pro­
fession’s program for audit quality, described in 
this report, both conceptually and in practice. 
The profession’s quality control standards, peer 
reviews of firms’ compliance with those stan­
dards, and the supporting strength of the special 
investigative process, with both public and regula­
tory oversight, combine to provide a sound, com­
prehensive, and effective assurance of audit 
quality.
The Board is aware that many responsible 
and respected members of the business and edu­
cational communities tend to view self-regulation 
as a replacement for government regulation. Their 
comments and criticisms, as well as the Board’s 
experiences in working with the AICPA program, 
have led the Board to reconsider both the objec­
tives and limitations of professional regulation.
The Board is convinced that professional 
regulation is needed in a free enterprise society, 
that it makes a significant contribution to the 
smooth and successful operation of business acti­
vity. The essence of professionalism is a personal 
commitment to excellence. Yet, important as per­
sonal commitment is, it is not enough; more must 
be provided. The committed individual needs 
education, encouragement, and knowledge of 
how others in the profession respond to various 
situations, opportunities, and contingencies. A 
dedicated professional also needs to be mindful 
of the surveillance by government in order to 
resist the temptations that occasionally arise.
Thus, rules, regulations, guides, and enforced 
discipline are needed to fortify and strengthen 
personal commitment. The individual prac­
titioner, the firm, fellow practitioners united in 
professional organizations, and government, all 
are a part of a structure that provides satisfactory 
professional services to society at a competitive 
price.
The Board finds a continuing dedication to 
improvement on the part of accounting firms that 
are members of the Section. Participation in peer 
reviews has introduced reviewers as well as those 
reviewed to new policies, procedures, and ideas 
that improve performance. These are quickly 
adopted and absorbed into their own practices. 
The Board has observed that, above all, the peer 
review process is a remarkably effective means of 
continuing professional development. Pro­
fessional self-regulation, as the Board sees it work­
ing in the Section’s program, is but one part of 
professional regulation in the broad sense. It can­
not and should not seek to replace or to emulate 
either public regulation or private regulation. 
Nor should either of these other two levels of 
regulation attempt to take over the role that peer 
regulation fills so well. The establishment of pro­
fessional standards of accounting, auditing, and 
quality control, the work of the AICPA Ethics 
Division, the educational programs of the AICPA 
and the state societies, the peer review program of 
the Division for CPA Firms, and investigations of 
alleged audit failures by the SEC Practice Section 
are all effective components of the profession’s 
self-regulatory activities and should be accepted 
as such.
As long as these diverse forces continue to be 
effective, we can look forward to continuing im­




Excerpt from Section IV, Membership, of the 
SECPS Manual
3. Requirements of Members
Member firms shall be obligated to abide by the 
following:
a. Ensure that a majority of members of the firms 
are CPAs, that the firm can legally engage in the 
practice of public accounting, and that each pro­
prietor, shareholder, or partner of the firm resi­
dent in the United States and eligible for AICPA 
membership is a member of the AICPA.
b. Adhere to quality control standards established 
by the AICPA Quality Control Standards Com­
mittee.
c. Submit to peer reviews of the firm’s account­
ing and audit practice every three years or at such 
additional times as designated by the executive 
committee, the reviews to be conducted in accor­
dance with review standards established by the 
section’s peer review committee.
d. Ensure that all professionals in the firm resi­
dent in the United States, including CPAs and 
non-CPAs, take part in qualifying continuing pro­
fessional education as follows:
(1) Participate in at least one hundred twenty 
hours every three years, but not less than 
twenty hours every year, or
(2) Comply with mandatory continuing pro­
fessional education requirements for state 
licensing or for state society membership, 
provided such state or society requirements 
require an average of forty hours per year 
of continuing professional education for 
each reporting period, and provided each 
professional in the firm participates in at 
least twenty hours every year.
e. Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of 
each SEC engagement that has had another audit 
partner-in-charge for a period of seven consecu­
tive years, and prohibit such incumbent partner 
from returning to in-charge status on the engage­
ment for a minimum of two years except as follows:
(1) This requirement does not apply to mem­
ber firms that have less than five SEC audit 
clients and less than 10 partners.
(2) An audit partner who has been the audit 
partner-in-charge of an SEC audit client 
for seven consecutive years may continue 
to serve in that capacity for audits for periods 
ending within two years from the date the 
firm becomes a member, or within two 
years from the date the firm no longer quali­
fies for the exemption in (1) above, which­
ever is later.
(3) An application for relief is granted by the 
peer review committee on the basis of un­
usual circumstances.
f. Ensure that a concurring review of the audit 
report by a partner other than the audit partner- 
in-charge of an SEC engagement is required before 
issuance of an audit report on the financial state­
ments of an SEC registrant. The peer review com­
mittee may authorize alternative procedures where 
this requirement cannot be met because of the 
size of the member firm.
g. File with the section for each fiscal year of the 
United States firm (covering offices maintained in 
the United States and its territories) the following 
information, within ninety days of the end of such 
fiscal year, to be open to public inspection.
( 1) Form of business entity (e.g., partnership 
or corporation) and identification of 
domestic affiliates rendering services to 
clients.
( 2) [Deleted]
( 3) Number and location of offices.
( 4) Total number of partners and non-CPAs 
with parallel status within the firm’s organ­
ization structure.
( 5) Total number of CPAs (including part­
ners).
( 6) Total number of professional staff (includ­
ing partners).
( 7) Total number of personnel (including item 
6, above).
( 8) Number of SEC clients for which the firm 
is principal auditor-of-record.
( 9) [Deleted]
(10) A statement indicating that the firm has 
complied with AICPA and SEC indepen­
dence requirements.
(11) Disclosure regarding pending litigation 
as required under generally accepted ac­
counting principles and indicating whether 
such pending litigation is expected to have 
a material effect on the firm’s financial 
condition or its ability to serve clients.
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(12) Gross fees for accounting and auditing, 
tax, and MAS, expressed as a percentage 
of total gross fees.
(13) Gross fees for both MAS and tax services 
performed for SEC audit clients, expressed 
as a percentage of total fees charged to all 
SEC audit clients.
(14) Names of firms merged or acquired dur­
ing the year and included in year-end 
numbers reported above and the number 
of offices, accounting and auditing per­
sonnel, and SEC clients of the acquired 
firm that were—
(i) Combined with practice units of the 
acquiring firm, or
(ii) Continued as separate practice units 
in the combined firm.
(15) Fees for MAS Services performed for SEC 
audit clients, expressed as a percentage of 
audit fees charged to SEC clients, pre­
pared in the following manner
Range of MAS Fees 
to Audit Fees for 





Total number of 
SEC audit clients
The total number of SEC audit clients re­
ported in this summary shall agree with the 
number reported pursuant to the require­
ments of section IV 3g (8). The firm shall 
also report how many of the number of 
SEC audit clients included in the “over 
100%” category fell into that category for 
three consecutive years, including the cur­
rent year.
h. Maintain such minimum amounts and types 
of accountants’ liability insurance as shall be pre­
scribed from time to time by the executive com­
mittee.
i. Adhere to the portions of the AICPA Code of 
Professional Ethics and Statements on Standards 
for Management Advisory Services dealing with 
independence in performing management advisory 
services for audit clients whose securities are regis­
tered with the SEC. Refrain from performing for 
such clients services that are inconsistent with the 
firm’s responsibilities to the public or that consist 
of the following types of services:
(1) Psychological testing.
(2) Public opinion polls.
(3) Merger and acquisition assistance for a fin­
der' s fee.
(4) Executive recruitm ent as described in 
Appendix A.
(5) Actuarial services to insurance companies 
as described in Appendix A.
j. Report annually to the audit committee or board 
of directors (or its equivalent in a partnership) of 
each SEC audit client on the total fees received 
from the client for management advisory services 
during the year under audit and a description of 
the types of such services rendered.
k. Report to the audit committee or board of 
directors (or its equivalent in a partnership) of 
each SEC audit client on financial accounting and 
reporting matters and auditing procedures which, 
if not satisfactorily resolved, would have caused 
the issuance of a qualified opinion on the client’s 
financial statements.
l. Pay dues as established by the executive com­
mittee and comply with the rules and regulations 
of the section, as established from time to time by 
the executive committee, and with the decisions 
of the executive committee in respect of matters 
within its competence; in connection with their 
duties including disciplinary proceedings, cooperate 
with the peer review committee and the special 
investigations committee established by resolu­
tion of the executive committee as set out in the 
Appendix B hereto; and comply with any sanction 
that may be imposed by the executive committee.
m. Report to the special investigations commit­
tee, within thirty days of service on the firm or its 
personnel of the first pleading in the matter or 
within thirty days of joining the section, if later, 
any litigation (including criminal indictments) 
against it or its personnel, or any proceeding or 
investigation publicly announced by a regula­
tory agency, commenced on or after November 1, 
1979 (not including additional proceedings aris­
ing out of or related to facts involved in litigation 
originally filed prior to November 1, 1979), that 
involves clients or former clients that are SEC 
registrants and that alleges deficiencies in the 
conduct of an audit or reporting thereon in con­
nection with any required filing under the federal 
securities laws. With respect to matters previously 
reported under this subparagraph, member firms 
shall report to the committee additional pro­
ceedings, settlements, court decisions on sub­
stantive issues, and the filing of appeals within 
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